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GOVERNANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: 
THE USE OF CODES OF CONDUCT AND LITIGATION TO CHANGE 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES’ BEHAVIOR 
By 
MARIA FERNANDA MATACH 
(Under the direction of Gabriel M. Wilner) 
ABSTRACT 
 Today no regulation adequately makes multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) comply with minimum human rights, labor, and environmental 
standards. Although there are many international initiatives and corporate 
codes, they lack enforcement mechanisms sufficient to ensure compliance. 
Further, individuals attempting to litigate claims against MNEs have to 
overcome many obstacles, such as piercing the corporate veil and forum non 
conveniens dismissals. 
 A positive change will occur if developing countries jointly set 
minimum standards and focus on implementation and enforcement. It is also 
recommended that the international community support this process by 
exerting pressure on a country or MNE that is not complying with the 
minimum standards. Finally, it is very important to make litigation against 
MNEs an available remedy for individuals by providing adequate forums, 
I 
revising corporate law to prevent the evasion of responsibility by assertion of 
the separate entities principle, and applying a more sensitive forum non 
conveniens doctrine. 
 
INDEX WORDS: Multinational enterprises, Codes of Conduct, Human rights, 
Labor standards, Environmental standards, Bribery, Litigation against 
multinationals, Corporate veil, Forum non conveniens. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
As traditional enterprises have evolved and grown to become the 
complex group of enterprises known as multinational enterprises (MNEs), 
they have become principal actors in the international arena.1 
Unfortunately, there is no parallel between the growth of MNEs and the 
creation of new laws to regulate them. There is no binding international 
law for MNEs that could regulate their conduct and provide for liability.2 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that MNEs are not subject to any law. 
Under the sovereignty principle, a state has the right “to regulate and 
supervise the activities of transnational corporations within its national 
jurisdiction and take measures to ensure that such activities comply with 
its laws, rules and regulations and conform with its economic and social 
policies.”3 However, national laws are not always effective in controlling 
MNEs’ operations.4
                                                 
1 Jose Engracia Antunes, The Liability of Polycorporate Enterprises, 13 CONN. J. INT’L L. 197, 203-204     
(1999). 
2 Tawny Aine Bridgeford, Note, Imputing Human Rights Obligations on Multinational Corporations: 
The Ninth Circuit Strikes Again in Judicial Activism, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.  1009, 1015-16 (2003). 
3 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, art.2 para. 2(b), G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 
29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 50, UN Doc. A/9631 (1974), reprinted in 14 ILM 251 (1975). 
4 Mark Gibney & R. David Emerick, The Extraterritorial Application of United States Law and the 
Protection of Human Rights: Holding Multinational Corporations to Domestic and International 
Standards, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 123, 123 (1996).  
 
1 
 Presently, MNEs play an important role in the global economy. In 
economic terms, they are as big as some countries,5 in some cases even 
bigger,6 and they mobilize a great deal of capital through their 
investments in different countries.7 They have accumulated so much 
economic and political power that, in some instances, the host countries 
are not in an equal position to bargain.8  
A MNE’s wealth depends on its ability to access markets around the 
world so that it can take advantage of lower costs of labor and raw 
materials and of less restrictive laws.9 In turn, foreign direct investment 
(FDI) by the MNE brings employment, technology, and capital to the host 
country.10 Poor countries in need of FDI compete with each other to 
attract those investments; in order to gain a competitive advantage, they 
often lower their human rights and environmental standards and make 
exceptions in the application of their laws and regulations.11 Not only are 
                                                 
   5 See Antunes, supra note 1, at 203-204. For instance, the author points out that the annual revenue 
of Standard Oil equals the gross domestic product (GDP) of Denmark, and the annual revenue of 
IBM equals the GDP of Portugal and Norway. 
6 See id.  For instance, the author mentions that the annual revenue of General Motors is higher 
than the GDP of Belgium. See also DETLEV F. VAGTS, WILLIAM S. DODGE & HAROLD HONGJU KOH, 
TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS, 201 (3d ed. 2003). The authors label the comparison between 
sales and GDP as misleading because “GDP is a measure of value added while sales are not”. And 
under estimates of valued added, the authors shows that ExxonMobil is slightly larger than the 
economy of Pakistan, and General Motors is slightly larger than the economy of Peru. 
7 Id. 
8 Douglas M. Branson, The Globalization of Corporate and Securities Law in the Twenty-First 
Century: The Social Responsibility of Large Multinational Corporations, 16 TRANSNAT'L LAW.  121, 131 
(2002). 
9 Elisa Westfield, Note, Globalization, Governance, and Multinational Enterprise Responsibility: 
Corporate Codes of Conduct in the 21st Century, 42 VA. J. INT'L L.  1075, 1080-81 (2002). 
10 See VAGTS, DODGE & KOH, supra note 6, at 204, analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of 
FDI. 
11 Meaghan Shaughenessy, Human Rights and the Environment: The United Nations Global Compact 
and the Continuing Debate About the Effectiveness of Corporate Voluntary Codes of Conduct, 2000 
COLO. J. INT’L  ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 159, 161-62 (2000).  
2 
 poor countries subject to pressure from other poor countries that engage 
in the race to the bottom, but they also fear the relocation of MNEs, a 
MNE power that acts as a “potent political force”12 in the FDI allocation 
process. In sum, the concern is that both MNEs and poor countries may 
favor lower standards; the former because such standards improve 
production efficiency, the latter because the standards attract FDI.13
The debate concerning this issue started three decades ago,14 but 
much has changed since then. In the beginning, host states were worried 
that MNEs were not observing local laws.15 Now the interests are different, 
and host countries, eager to obtain FDI, are more lenient toward MNEs; as 
a result, “[MNEs] obey host country law, but they thereby ignore 
international standards.”16 Accordingly, it can be inferred that the 
interests of MNEs rarely match the interests of the general public, which in 
turn is not always represented by the host country governments.17
The issue is highly controversial and subject to improvements at the 
national and international levels, as well as in the private and public 
spheres.  Two events occurred in the last decade that are significant 
towards establishing greater responsibility of MNEs. The first event is the 
                                                 
12 Halina Ward, Securing Transnational Corporate Accountability Through National Courts: 
Implications and Policy Options, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 451, 466 (2001). 
13 Westfield, supra note 9, at 1081. 
  14 Seymour J. Rubin, Transnational Corporations and International Codes of Conduct: A Study of the 
Relationship between International Legal Cooperation and Economic Development, 10 AM. U.J. INT’L 
L. & POL’Y 1275, 1276 (1995). 
  15 Sydney M. Cone, III, et al., The Multinational Enterprise as Global Corporate Citizen, 21 N.Y.L.  
SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 26 (2001). 
16 Id. 
17 See Rubin, supra note 14, at 1278. 
3 
 proliferation of codes of conduct for MNEs that will be analyzed in Part II. 
The second event is the wave of litigation that has taken place in the last 
years, pressing for greater imputation of liability on MNEs, which will be 
the object of study in Part III.  In Part IV, five recommendations are 
proposed to achieve greater responsibility and accountability of MNEs. The 
proposals are based on gaps in the status quo, analyzed in Parts II and 
III, that impede adequate regulation of MNEs.  
This thesis argues that an effective solution is possible only if host 
countries jointly raise their low standards. In addition, it is suggested that  
international organizations as well as MNE home countries can play an 
important role in this process by ensuring that each country is effectively 
enforcing the higher standards and MNEs are complying with host country 
laws, and by exerting pressure when they are not. It is also proposed, 
with the goal to promote the legal accountability of MNEs, that traditional 
concepts of corporate law be adapted to new challenges that are 
presented by MNEs, that host countries should ensure their nationals an 
adequate forum to litigate against MNEs, and that the forum non 
conveniens doctrines should employ a more sensitive criteria with 
attention to the special circumstances of each case.  
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II. CODES OF CONDUCT 
 
Before beginning the analysis, some clarifications are necessary. 
Although the thesis refers to international standards in general, including 
human rights, labor, and environmental standards, the thesis will omit 
reference to specific environmental conventions to avoid a superficial 
analysis of an extensive issue.  The paper will also omit reference to codes 
concerning specific sectors of industry18 even thought the standards are 
more effectively addressed in a sector-by-sector basis; instead, the thesis 
will focus only on those codes and conventions that address MNEs or 
governments in general for the purpose of limiting the extension of the 
analysis. 
 
  A. Regulation from International Organizations 
 
It can be found some regulation and initiatives, regarding the 
compliance of minimum standards and addressed to governments and/or 
MNEs, within the ambit of the United Nations, the Organization for the 
                                                 
18 Examples of specific codes of conduct that were created within the ambit of the United Nations 
are The International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes of 1981 by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the International Code 
of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides of 1985 by Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO), which was amended in 1989. 
5 
 Economic Cooperation and Development, the International Labor 
Organizations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the 
World Trade Organization. 
 
1. Within the Ambit of the United Nations  
 
The United Nations (UN) performed two works addressed to MNEs: 
the Draft Code and the Global Compact. Although the Draft Code is 
obsolete, it will be analyzed for its historic importance because it was the 
first initiative in this direction and it is the start point of the conflicts of 
interest between developed and developing countries that impede 
consensus on imposing standards of conduct to MNEs. 
 
  a.   The Draft Code  
 
In 1974, the UN reacted to the involvement of a MNE in the events 
that led to the coup d’etat in Chile by setting up the Commission on 
Transnational Corporations and the Information and Research Center on 
Transnational Corporations.19 The action followed from the suggestions of 
a report by the Group of Eminent Persons, which had been established by 
the UN Secretary General and comprised representatives from developed 
                                                 
19 Kari Tapiola, The Importance of Standards and Corporate Responsibilities: The Role of Voluntary 
Corporate Codes of Conduct 2 (OECD Conference, Paris, Sept. 20-21, 1999) available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/4/2089872.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2004). 
6 
 and developing nations.20 The Commission had as a priority the 
formulation of the Code of Conduct for MNEs, and among other tasks, the 
enhancement of the bargaining power of poor countries in negotiations.21  
The purposes of the Code included the following: “[to ensure] respect 
for national sovereignty, [to] establish policies of countries in which 
transnational corporations operate, … [to promote] the right of the host 
countries to regulate and monitor transnational corporations activities [,] 
to foster transnational corporations contributions to developmental goals 
[,] to prohibit subversion or interference in the internal affairs of countries 
and other inadmissible activities.”22
However, in the course of negotiations, lack of consensus relating to 
the content of the Code, produced by conflicts of interest between rich 
and poor countries, made clear that a binding code was legally and 
politically infeasible.23 Later, structural changes and different priorities 
made the Code obsolete.24  
Developing countries initially viewed MNE activity as a way to impose 
the MNEs’ home country policies and they wanted protection against that 
kind of invasion.25 By the 1980s, however, their desire to obtain 
investments from MNEs superseded their wish to regulate MNEs.26   
                                                 
20 Rubin, supra note 14, at 1282. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 1287. 
23 Tapiola, supra note 19, at 2. 
24 Id. 
  25 Id. 
26 Id. 
7 
 The structure of MNEs has also undergone a major change “from 
hierarchies to networks”; MNEs now have their offices all over the world, 
home countries have lost their influence, the nationality of MNEs has 
diminished in importance, and host countries’ fear of invasion of their 
policies has faded.27
In 1982, an incomplete draft was published and continuously revised 
until 1992 when negotiations were suspended.28 Actually, the draft “has 
become a dead letter,” and a copy of it is extremely difficult to obtain.29
 
 
b. The Global Compact 
 
After the unsuccessful attempt by the UN to make a binding code of 
conduct for MNEs, the UN more recently developed the Global Compact 
2000 (GC), by initiative of Secretary-General Kofi Annan, which invites 
corporations to support ten key principles in the areas of human rights, 
labor, environment and anti-corruption: to respect and support the 
protection of human rights; to make sure not to be complicit to human 
right abuses; to uphold freedom of association and recognition of the right 
to collective bargaining; to eliminate forced and compulsory labor; to 
                                                 
27 Id. at 3. 
    28  VAGTS, DODGE &  KOH, supra note 6, at 205. 
29 Branson, supra note 8, at 136. 
8 
 abolish child labor30; to eliminate discrimination in employment; to 
support the precautionary approach to environmental problems; to 
promote greater environmental responsibility; to encourage and develop 
the diffusion of environmental-friendly technologies; and to fight against 
all forms of corruption, including bribery and extortion.31  
In order to participate, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of each MNE 
has to send a letter to the UN Secretary General expressing the MNE’s 
support; the CEO should further implement changes to business 
operations such that the principles becomes part of the strategy, culture, 
and day-to-day operation of the MNE.32 In addition, the company must 
publicly advocate the GC through press releases, speeches, etc., and 
publish in its annual reports the ways in which it is supporting the GC and 
its principles.33  
In addition, the GC provides for annual Global Policy Dialogues, 
action-oriented meetings that focus on specific issues relating to 
                                                 
30 The four principles relating to labor standards are better known as the “core labor standards” in 
the international community due to their importance in this area. They were delineated in the 
World Summit on Social Development, which took place in Copenhagen in March of 1995. See 
Steve Charnovitz, Trade, Employment and Labor Standards: The OECD Study and Recent 
Developments in the Trade and Labor Standards Debate, 11 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 131, 133. 
(1997) (book review). A study conducted by the Organization for Economic Development and 
Cooperation (OECD) in 1996 found that the core labor standards enhance economic efficiency. Id. 
at 139-44. 
31 See The Global Compact: The Ten Principles, at 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Portal/Default.asp (last visited July 30, 2004).  
32 See The Global Compact: How to Participate in the Global Compact, at 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Portal/Default.asp (last visited July 30, 2004). 
33 Id. 
9 
 globalization and corporate citizenship, which provide some guidance to 
MNEs the application of GC principles.34
The success of the GC relies completely on public accountability and 
the self-interest of the corporations. 35 It is not a binding instrument, it 
does not have mechanisms for the monitoring of the activity of 
corporations to ensure compliance of the corporations with their 
commitments, and it provides no sanctions for violations.36 In order to 
ensure the enforcement of the GC, the UN can only persuade MNE 
executives to adopt the principles or use negative publicity against the 
MNEs.37
This UN initiative has been criticized for these weaknesses.38 Human 
rights organizations generally have demanded mandatory compliance of 
the GC or monitoring of MNEs’ performance.39 The Secretary General of 
Amnesty International has said that, to gain credibility, the GC should at 
least implement independent monitoring and make public the results.40 
Critics also point out that many of the MNEs that are committed to the GC 
were involved in abuses in the past; the MNEs nevertheless continue to 
benefit from the good name of the UN, which should not be permitted.41
                                                 
34 Id. 
35 See The Global Compact: What Is the Global Compact? at 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Portal/Default.asp (last visited July 30, 2004). 
36 Westfield, supra note 9, at 1091. 
37 Id. 
38 Shaughenessy, supra note 11, at 161. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
10 
  Nonetheless, the most important value of the GC resided in its 
cooperative nature; the Compact involve the cooperation of corporations, 
governments, labor organizations and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs).  
 
  2. Within the Ambit of the Organization for the Economic Cooperation and 
Development 
 
In the 1970s, the Organization for the Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) prepared a parallel work to the UN Code, the 
Guidelines for MNEs, which was approved in 1976.42 The Guidelines were 
later revised in 2000 incorporating standards that had been developed in 
the previous two decades.43 Advancing the interests of developed 
countries, which are the only members of the OECD and which also are 
home countries of most MNEs, the Guidelines primarily aimed to achieve 
the following goals: to improve the climate for investment, to prevent 
discrimination against MNEs, to ensure that MNEs operate in harmony 
with the governments of host countries, and to strengthen the mutual 
confidence between MNEs and host country governments.44
                                                 
42 VAGTS, DODGE & KOH, supra note 6, at 205. 
43 Among the changes of the revision, the updated Guidelines promote the elimination of child labor 
and forced labor; the environmental section now encourages MNEs to improve their environmental 
performance; and there are two new chapters on consumer interests and on combating bribery.  
44 Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OECD, 10 (June 27, 2000), available at 
http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2000doc.nsf/4f7adc214b91a685c12569fa005d0ee7/c125692700623b
11 
 The principles promoted by the OECD, which correspond to the 
policies enunciated in its Guidelines, are as follows: to contribute to 
sustainable development, to respect human rights, to encourage human 
capital formation, to promote self-regulatory practices, to abstain from 
any improper involvement in political activities, and to respect local 
laws.45 The principles also advocate more extensive disclosure to achieve 
greater transparency in business, to combat bribery, and to support the 
core labor standards.46 In addition, they encourage the use of 
environmental-friendly practices and protect consumer interests.47 Finally, 
they require MNEs to comply with the competition and taxation laws of 
host countries.48
The Guidelines are “recommendations addressed by governments to 
multinational enterprises.”49 They provide voluntary standards; however, 
follow-up mechanisms substitute for the lack of binding obligations.50 The 
OECD provides for regular reviews and discussions of cases with 
recommendations from the Committee on International Investment and 
MNE.51  
                                                                                                                                                             
74c125695400540788/$FILE/00082259.DOC (last visited Nov.24, 2004), reprinted in 40 I.L.M. 237 
(2001) [hereinafter OECD Guidelines]. 
45 Id. at 12-13, reprinted in 40 I.L.M. at 240. 
46 Id. at 15-20, reprinted in 40 I.L.M. at 240-46. It requires disclosure of information not only of 
the MNE financial situation and performance, but also non-financial information such as 
environmental and social reporting. 
47 Id. at 18-19, reprinted in 40 I.L.M. at 243-45. 
48 Id. at 23-24, reprinted in 40 I.L.M. at 246. 
49 Id. at 12, reprinted in 40 I.L.M. at 237. 
50 Tapiola, supra note 19, at 2. 
51 Id. In the recommendations made by the Committee the name of the MNE involved cannot be 
specified. 
12 
 3. Within the Ambit of the International Labor Organization 
 
 In 1977, the International Labor Organization (ILO) adopted the 
Tripartite Declaration on Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy,52 
which would constitute the social and employment chapter of the UN 
Code.53 Under the Tripartite Declaration, MNEs must guarantee the rights 
to union activity and collective bargaining.54 The Tripartite Declaration is 
also deals with health and safety issues, employment policy, training, 
equality, and job security.55  And as the OECD Guidelines, this Declaration 
provides only “guidelines” to MNEs, governments, and employers’ and 
worker’s organizations.56  
In order to monitor the compliance of the Tripartite Declaration, the 
ILO conducts periodic surveys and the results are submitted to the ILO 
Governing Body for further discussion.57  
In case of disagreement about the application of the Tripartite 
Declaration, the governments can submit a request for interpretation to 
the ILO.58
                                                 
52 Tripartite Declaration on Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, ILO (Nov. 1977) (amended 
Nov. 2000) [hereinafter ILO Tripartite Declaration] available at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/multi/download/english.pdf (last visited Aug. 6, 
2004). 
53 Tapiola, supra note 19, at 2. 
54 ILO Tripartite Declaration, supra note 52, at 8-10. 
55 Id. at 4-8. 
  56 Id. at v. 
  57 Id. 
  58 Id. 
13 
 In 1998, the International Labor Conference adopted the ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its follow-
up mechanism, which specify the way in which countries must apply the 
“core labor standards”,59 particularly highlighting the need to develop 
promotional measures to support governments in their task. 60
 More interestingly, the 1998 Declaration is addressed to 
governments instead of MNEs, placing the responsibility on states to adopt 
the necessary regulations in their domestic laws in order to make MNEs 
comply with the 1998 Declaration’s guidelines.61 The 1998 Declaration 
nevertheless is a voluntary instrument despite efforts by unions and 
developing countries to make it binding.62 Although it places duties on 
states, it provides no sanctions for violations.63  
Although the ILO principles are not corporate policies, in the long run, 
it is expected that they will attain that status as governments incorporate 
the principles into their domestic law ensuring that companies which 
operate within the states’ territories comply with the principles. 64
                                                 
  59 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
60 Westfield, supra note 9, at 1192. The ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work (June 1998) available at 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECLARATIONWEB.static_jump?var_language=EN&var_pagename
=DECLARATIONTEXT (last visited Aug. 6, 2004); Follow-up to the Declaration (June 1988) 
available at 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECLARATIONWEB.static_jump?var_language=EN&var_pagename
=DECLARATIONFOLLOWUP (last visited Aug. 6, 2004).
61 Tapiola, supra note 19, at 4. 
62 Id. 
63 Westfield, supra note 9, at 1192. 
64 Id. 
14 
   ILO’s labor standards further have achieved general approbation 
because they are established with the participation of unions, companies, 
and local governments of developed and developing countries,65 and all of 
the organization’s conventions have been approved by at least two-thirds 
of its delegates. 66
 
4. Within Financial Organizations: the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank 
 
Both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) 
are extremely active in developing countries, although they have been 
accused of having a “friendly” attitude towards MNEs since they promote 
globalization and the reduction of obstacles impeding MNE activity.67  For 
instance, during the Asian financial crisis, the IMF formulated a detailed 
program that included a commitment of the Asian countries “to regulate 
merchant banks, to eliminate various restrictions on foreign ownership of 
domestic corporations, to permit foreign banks to establish subsidiaries in 
the country, and to eliminate quotas, subsidies and other practices that 
were inconsistent with the rules of the GATT/WTO system.”68   
                                                 
65 Id. at 1196. 
66 Charnovitz, supra note 30, at 136. 
67 Id. 
68 VAGTS, DODGE & KOH, supra note 6, at 182. 
15 
 Critics considered the measures to be too intrusive, exceeding the 
main function of the IMF, which is to balance payment adjustments.69 
Advocates argued that the measures were necessary to obtain structural 
changes of the evils that had caused the Asian crisis, such as “crony 
capitalism, corruption, and weak regulation”.70
In reality, the IMF and the WB are able to exert great financial 
pressure because countries that need loan reimbursements have to 
commit to the institutions’ programs, which have been labeled as “the 
Golden Straitjacket” by Thomas Friedman.71 The programs mainly require 
from the governments: fiscal austerity, privatization of public enterprises, 
modernization of economic laws, and elimination of corruption.72 The 
conditions of the programs are primarily economic in character; they omit 
any reference to human rights, labor, or environmental standards.73   
 
5. Within the World Trade Organization 
 
The relationship between trade and labor standards was part of the 
debate of the first Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization 
                                                 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Branson, supra note 8, at 136-37. 
72 Id. at 137. 
73 Id.  
16 
 (WTO) in Singapore in 1996.74 Later, in 1999, the issue was again part of 
the agenda in the WTO Seattle talks.75  
The WTO has high enforcement potential because it can force states 
to comply with minimum standards  “[b]y withholding most favored 
nation status or participation in multinational trade agreements.”76 
However, the different interests held by developed and developing 
nations, as in the UN process, proved to be an obstacle against the 
achievement of consent and the introduction minimum standards in the 
agenda. In Singapore, the United States supported the introduction of 
minimum standards, India and other developing countries opposed such 
standards, and the EU remained divided.77 Trade ministers from Macau 
and Uganda stated that the introduction of labor standards to the WTO 
would have negative effects on the economy of poor countries.78 
Developing countries did not trust developed countries; they saw the 
attempt to introduce minimum standards as a “protectionism” measure 
that would favor rich countries at the expense of poor countries.79 Since 
the proposal for labor standards came from the United States, the Clinton 
Administration's repeated anti-trade actions may have been a reason for 
these concerns.80
                                                 
74 Westfield, supra note 9, at 1076-77. 
75 Id. at 1077. 
76 Branson, supra note 8, at 138. 
77 Westfield, supra note 9, at 1077. 
78 Charnovitz, supra note 30, at 144. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 155. 
17 
 The result of the Singapore Conference was a broad declaration that 
the WTO would "explore ways of enhancing cooperat[ion] with the ILO."81 
Subsequently, WTO Director-General Renato Ruggiero clarified that the 
reference about the ILO only allows the WTO Secretariat to exchange 
information between the organizations.82 In particular, the trade ministers 
refused to establish a committee in trade and labor similar to the 
Committee on Trade and Environment, which was created in 1994 to 
analyze the relationship between trade and environmental agreements.83    
Although it can be inferred from the WTO Singapore Declaration that 
“the Ministerial did not consider the WTO a competent body capable to set 
labor standards,”84 a positive change can be expected in the future if the 
ILO take a more active role in enforcing labor standards. Indeed, even 
though human rights and labor standards are not actually part of the WTO 
agenda, among the issues included in the fourth WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Doha of 2001 were the relationship between environment 
and trade, as well as greater transparency in government.85
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 B. Efforts to Combat Bribery and Achieve Greater Transparency in 
Transnational Business 
 
Legislation to combat bribery and achieve greater transparency is 
essential in order to ensure that the enforcement of human rights, labor, 
and environmental standards is effective; otherwise, it will be easy for 
MNEs to circumvent the legal system.  
Corruption commonly affects developed as well as developing 
countries, although in the latter the degree of corruption is higher because 
weak legal systems, which is common in poor countries, contribute to it.86  
The consequences of corrupt practices can be very dramatic. Many deaths 
occurred around the world “due to the convergence of negligence, 
inexperience, and corruption.”87
Bribery is the most common and major form of corruption. It can be 
defined as “the conferral of a benefit to a public official in exchange for 
abuse or misuse of that official's office.”88 And particularly, “transnational 
bribery occurs when a businessperson from one country (the "home" 
country) bribes a public official of another country (the "host" country).”89
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        International organizations have become concerned about the 
possible consequences of transnational bribery90 and some organizations 
have reacted by asking their member states to enact legislation 
criminalizing transnational bribery.91 Examples of these initiatives are the 
UN Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in International 
Commercial Transactions,92 the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions,93 the Inter-
American Convention Against Corruption,94 and the Convention on the 
Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials of the European Union 
Communities or Officials of Member States of the European Union.95  
For instance, the Inter-American Convention requires its members to 
allow the extradition of bribe-taking and bribe-giving officials,96 to 
criminalize the officials’ assets that cannot be justified in relation to their 
salaries during their terms,97 and to ban the use of the bank secrecy 
defense in the course of investigations.98 The OECD Convention requires 
its members to assist each other in investigations and to allow the 
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98 See id., art. XVI, 35 I.L.M. at 732 (bank secrecy laws). 
20 
 extradition of violators.99 The OECD has been the most successful 
initiative because, under the threat of its sanctions, almost all of its 
members have enacted legislation to combat transnational bribery, and 
such legislation is imminent in the remaining member states.100
In addition, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are 
actively dealing with corruption, threatening to stop financial aid to bribe-
soliciting countries.101  The WTO also has created a Working Group on 
Transparency in Government Procurement102 that is preparing a draft for 
an agreement on transparency in government procurement.103
Even the International Chamber of Commerce had adopted in 1996 
the Rules of Conduct to Combat Extortion and Bribery, a voluntary code of 
corporate conduct. The Rules proscribe the demand or acceptance of any 
bribe or kickback, request companies to control payments by their agents, 
and require the maintenance of financial records to prevent the hiding of 
illicit payments or secret funds.104  
Recently, this concern has also reached the ambit of the Global 
Compact. At the Leader Summit of June 24, 2004, UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan declared  “[A]t your urging, and after extensive consultations 
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 with all participants that yielded overwhelming expressions of support, the 
Global Compact henceforth will include a tenth principle, against 
corruption, reflecting the recently adopted United Nations convention on 
that subject.” 105 The tenth principle states, “Businesses should work 
against corruption in all its forms, including extortion and bribery.”106
 
C. Corporate Codes of Conduct 
 
In the 1990s, MNEs started voluntarily adopting their own corporate 
codes in reaction to the public demand for greater responsibility.107 
Although these codes are merely self-regulation instruments, and MNEs 
strongly advocate against binding codes, the spotlight effect acts as a 
potent motivator of compliance.  
 
1. The Spotlight Effect 
 
 Today there is a general interest in international business and MNE 
behavior, and as a natural consequence, MNEs are much more sensitive to 
public pressure of any kind. When companies invest abroad, they not only 
bring their capital and technology to the host country but also their brand 
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 names, reputations, and international images.108 If they are caught 
engaging in bad conduct, activist groups and the international media jump 
into action with negative campaigns that can greatly affect a company, 
especially if the company is involved in consumer products.109 As Bob 
Hass, former CEO of Levi Strauss, once emphasized, “In today’s world, a 
TV exposure on working conditions can undo years of effort to build brand 
loyalty.” 110
Consumers will not buy a product that was made in violation of 
human rights, labor, and environmental standards.111 A Corporate Edge 
survey showed that “fifty eight percent of the consumers polled said they 
would boycott a brand if they knew that a company was employing 
children that make its product.”112 At this level, fifty-eight percent can 
represent the loss of tons of money.  
MNEs may stop doing business with abusive suppliers, and require 
the suppliers to comply with their own corporate codes of conduct.113 
Some MNEs have even withdrawn their operations from countries that 
violate human rights and labor conditions.114  The MNEs do this not 
because the morality of MNEs has changed, but because it is now in the 
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 MNEs’ economic benefit to do so. They are learning that what is at stake is 
their “social license to operate.”115
 It is undoubted that in the current economy, in competition among 
MNEs, market behavior has become a deciding factor.116 Once MNEs have 
agreed to comply with corporate codes, they will be forced to do it by the 
market, not by the law117. For instance, a California consumer sued Nike 
under the California’s Unfair Competition Law for making false statements 
in its corporate code in regard to its labor practices abroad.118
  The spotlight effect also balances “the fiduciary duties owed by 
officers and directors, which mandates maximization of shareholder 
wealth, to the exclusion of all other values,” 119 because MNEs still need to 
support human and labor rights and environmental-friendly practices; 
otherwise, a bad reputation in these areas could affect the shareholders’ 
wealth. 
  Nevertheless, MNEs do not always have a motivation to comply with 
the corporate codes since they all lack the legal mechanisms to enforce 
the codes, and if a MNE does not sell products directly to consumers, it is 
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 not subject to sufficient exposure to care about maintaining a good 
reputation.120  
 The issue ultimately turns on a MNE’s skill at promotion and 
marketing.121 The adoption of codes of conduct is used as a public 
relations tool by many MNEs, creating a dichotomy between what they 
claim they do and what they really do.122 Many MNEs have adopted their 
own codes following a scandal in an effort to restore their public 
images.123 Public relations specialists can change “the public perception of 
MNEs” with a highly publicized program that advocates to global 
responsibility. 124  Skeptics claim that codes do little to improve human 
rights;125 they assert that many MNEs “don’t do anything with the 
[codes]; they simply paste them on the walls to impress employees, 
customers, suppliers and the public.” 126
  
2. MNEs’ Opposition to Binding Codes 
 
 On the other hand, MNEs contend that they are not only influenced 
by consumer expectations; rather, they have another motivating interest 
                                                 
120 Shaughenessy, supra note 11, at 163. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. For instance, the author mentions Levi Strauss, Sears, J.C. Penney, Wall-Mart, Phillips-Van    
Heusen, The Gap, Nike, Reebok, and Timberland, as companies that adopted their own corporate 
codes after negative publicity of forced labor in China and child labor in Southeast Asia. 
124 Westfield, supra note 9, at 1100. 
125 Id. 
126 Shaughenessy, supra note 11, at 163. 
25 
 related to their recruiter efforts, in gaining a good reputation.127 They 
admit that no company would emphasize that its only interest rests in 
maximizing profits because companies are recruiting everywhere and 
nobody wants to work for a bad company.128 Companies strongly maintain 
that they take a lot of pride when they work with high standards, which 
bring value to the company.129  
However, MNEs continue to oppose any attempts to make corporate 
codes binding, arguing, “[S]omething that is good investment towards the 
value creating potential of the company will be regarded as a cost, an 
expense that needs to be minimized.”130 MNEs further argue that if the 
codes are mandatory, it would limit their ability to adapt their standards 
to varying competitive conditions in the different markets, which can place 
them at a disadvantage to MNEs that do not comply with the mandatory 
codes or to domestic companies that only comply with the low standards 
of host countries.131 They also fear that the creation of governmental 
organs to monitor their compliance with the codes “would lead to 
bureaucratic administration replacing market mechanisms.”132 MNE 
executives emphasize that more can be achieved by promoting voluntary 
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 codes of conduct and by encouraging enterprises to be a role model for 
the other MNEs.133
 
D. Challenges 
 
There are three obstacles that impede the effectiveness of 
international regulations and corporate codes: the lack of consensus on 
minimum standards, the lack of enforcement and monitoring mechanisms 
and the controversy whether MNEs can be actors of international law.  
 
  1. Consensus on Minimum Standards 
 
 An adequate way for a MNE to avoid bad publicity and litigation is to 
make sure that the best possible standards apply wherever the MNE 
operates, at home as well as abroad.134 Nevertheless, that would be an 
unrealistic solution due to differences in the standards adopted in the 
home country and in the host country.135  
Host countries often have deliberately adopted lower standards to 
attract investment, and MNEs take advantage of this race to the bottom in 
order to remain competitive and to maximize their profits. 136   
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  There is a need to set minimum standards in order to level the 
playing field.  Such standards will not be produced by the market alone.137 
An internationally coordinated approach would be necessary to ensure 
that regulation is effective, at least creating general consensus in the 
minimum standards.138  
 Moreover, the standards generally found in international or corporate 
codes are too broad to be applied, and in some cases, there is no 
consensus about the exact standards. For instance, it is not clear yet if 
MNEs should have an active role doing good things or if they simply 
should avoid doing wrong.139 There is general consensus that MNEs should 
not be complicit to human right violations but the type of behavior which 
will make MNEs complicit is unsettled.140 There is a great need to be more 
specific about what these standards are to ensure compliance. 
 
2. Enforcement and Monitoring Mechanisms 
  
Since all of the corporate codes developed by international 
organizations have a promotional rather than normative character, mainly 
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 conceived as guidelines or models for MNEs corporate codes, they entrust 
the enforcement of the corporate codes to the MNEs themselves.141 The 
delegation of enforcement to the MNEs themselves provides no guarantee 
that there will be any compliance at all; and even if MNEs comply, they 
may adopt different degrees of compliance with their codes, which will 
lead to a consisting lowering of standards because MNE that lose business 
“by applying more powerful enforcement mechanisms will be replaced by 
companies with less effective enforcement procedures.”142
 The corporate codes are essentially “statement[s] of intent”; only if 
they are enforced and monitored they become real rules.143 It is important 
that the monitoring function is external to the company and that the 
results are made public. If that information is available to the public, 
consumers and investors will be able to make smart decisions in the way 
they want to spend or invest their money,144 and public exposure can be 
an incentive for MNEs to do their best to comply with their codes. 
 
3. Placement of MNEs as Actors of the International Law 
 
In order to make a valid claim that MNEs do not comply with 
international law, it first has to be determined whether international law 
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 can impose rights and duties on MNEs, as is done the case with states.145 
The genesis of this phenomenon may be found in the privatization 
process, where there has been a shift of roles; MNEs have started doing 
what the government used to do, and as a consequence, now the 
complaints are directed against MNEs in the same way that they used to 
be directed against governments for human rights violations.146 
Confronted with the passive attitude of the states, “individuals are taking 
the law in their own hands”147 trying to hold MNEs responsible, and 
supporting the creation of greater MNE rights and obligations.148 Through 
these efforts, individuals are bringing international law into the domestic 
arena, and the international law is becoming “privatized” because private 
actors (individuals and MNEs) are becoming both agents and subjects of 
international law.149
 Affirmative support for the view of MNEs as actors under 
international law is particularly reasonable in consideration of the 
precedents in that direction.150 For instance, many international 
environmental law treaties hold “polluters” liable for the environmental 
harm that they cause, and the new international regime on bribery places 
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 duties on corporations.151 MNEs also already have certain rights at the 
international level, such as the right to seek arbitration under bilateral 
investment agreements, and the right to assert claims against a 
government for violations of free speech or other human rights.152  
 Although the development of greater MNEs duties under 
international law is highly desirable and certainly possible in the future, 
the solutions proposed by this thesis will focus on the regulation of MNEs 
by national laws because domestic regulation is a prerequisite to 
international consensus on the development of international regulation. 
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III. LITIGATION AGAINST MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 
 
 Although MNEs actually have some rights and duties under 
international law, no international forum exists that can hold a MNE 
accountable for its business activities.153 The only way to do this is 
through the judicial system of local governments, where the violation took 
place or where the parent company is located, for violations of 
international law which have been incorporated into domestic laws or into 
treaties signed by the country where the forum is located.154  
In the last few years, there has been a wave of claims against parent 
companies for the conduct of their subsidiaries abroad.155 After all, each 
state “has the authority to control the way in which its nationals interact 
with other states,”156 and each state can regulate the activity of its 
corporations abroad by enacting extraterritorial laws.157
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 A. The Value of Litigation Against MNEs 
 
Litigation against MNEs for their conduct abroad, as well as 
regulation, is an important factor in modifying the conduct of MNEs.158  It 
is in the MNEs’ own interest to avoid litigation due to the likely drop in 
share price as a result of the threat of liability.159 Litigation also levels the 
playing field since it reaches not only public brands but also those 
companies that are not harmed by a bad reputation since they don’t have 
consumer products. 160 In addition, litigation is a solution against the claim 
that corporate codes are used as a public relations tool because it can 
uncover discrepancies between what MNEs say they do and what they 
really do.161 Finally, the general public pays extremely close attention to 
such cases, which undoubtedly can trigger an adverse impact on the 
reputation of the brands involved, which in turn can motivate a change in 
business practices.162  
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 B. The Type of Litigation and Its Causes 
 
 The MNEs’ immortality, wealth, and size make them attractive 
defendants. 163 Some actions are initiated for human rights abuses or 
exploitation of workers; others focus on environmental damage or lack of 
respect and harm done to the culture of indigenous populations.164 Other 
claims are based on lack of transparency and non-compliance with 
domestic and international laws.165
In some cases, litigation against a parent company for the acts of its 
subsidiary abroad happens simply because the subsidiary responsible for 
the damages no longer exists and the only way to recover damages is to 
go after the parent company.166 The Holocaust and World War II cases 
present such a situation since the events happened more than fifty years 
ago, and the MNEs involved are the only responsible parties still available 
for suit.167
However, in most cases, this litigation occurs due to differences 
between the legal systems of the home country and the host country, as 
well as governance deficiencies in the latter.168  Among the differences in 
legal systems, some home countries offer the possibility of a higher 
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 recovery.169  For instance, the United States, the home of many MNEs, is 
the most attractive forum in which to litigate because of the many 
procedural advantages that it offers, such as broad discovery, contingent 
fee arrangements, and the possibility of a civil jury.170     
The advantages that are offered by the U.S. legal system not only are 
pro-plaintiff; in some instances, they make possible litigation of claims for 
which the plaintiff would have no remedy in other forums.  The right to 
trial by jury is also favorable to the plaintiff since American jurors come 
from very different backgrounds than professional judges and they tend to 
be more sensitive to the plaintiff’s claims.171 Furthermore, juries generally 
give bigger awards than judges.172 The contingent fee, whereby the 
lawyer will only be paid a portion of the award if he wins the case, 
moreover makes possible litigation by poor plaintiffs and by the risk-
adverse plaintiff who then would have nothing to lose.173 Finally, 
procedural rules permit plaintiff to assert vague claims, with little 
evidence, and later substantiate his claim through the use of the broad 
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 discovery rules,174 which make available information that otherwise would 
be out of the plaintiff’s reach. 175
 In contrast, host countries often lack the financial and legal 
resources necessary to guarantee justice in a particular case.  One typical 
example is the unavailability of class action suits, which is an American 
device that “offers a means of disposing of sometimes hundreds of 
thousands of claims in one trial, with the sole remaining issue being proof 
of damages.”176 In the Aguinda case,177 for example, thousands of 
Ecuadorian indigenous people sued Texaco in the United States because 
class actions suits are unavailable in Ecuador.178
Nevertheless, a major problem remains the fact that plaintiffs are 
intimidated to look for justice in their own forums because developing 
countries are blemished with corruption.179 Although MNEs could try to 
avoid litigation by applying good standards; they also could simply 
relocate their plants to host countries where the risk of liability is 
smaller.180 Due to the economic interests involved, the threat of relocation 
can corrupt the administration of justice in host countries and further 
diminished the protection afforded to host countries nationals. In some 
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 cases, the lack of impartiality is more evident when the government is 
involved in MNE operations, acting as a business partner of a MNE.181
 
 C. Obstacles 
 
Although litigation is a useful way to influence MNEs to operate with 
care, a plaintiff has to overcome many hurdles.182 First, if a subsidiary no 
longer exists or does not have enough assets, it can be very difficult to 
reach the parent company under the “separate entities” principle. Second, 
the plaintiff has to litigate in a forum with both subject matter and 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant; in addition, if the judgment has 
to be enforced in another forum, the plaintiff has to determine whether 
the second forum will recognize the jurisdiction and decision of the first 
forum.183 Third, even if a common law forum has jurisdiction, the case still 
can be dismissed under forum non conveniens grounds. A defendant also 
may assert non-justiciability, whereby a judge may dismiss a case if it 
finds that a judicial decision would interfere with the authority of the 
political branches.184 In the end, a plaintiff may have no legal remedies 
due to all these obstacles. 
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 1. Limits of Traditional Corporate Law 
 
 Corporate law has undergone substantial evolution. Commercial 
activity originally was only regulated by the laws of commerce and the 
company was identified with the owner of the business, who was 
personally liable for all of the debts of the company. 185  The modern 
corporate law of most Western countries employs the separate entity 
principle, which recognizes that that the corporation and its shareholders 
are separate juridical entities, and the debts and liabilities of the 
corporation are separate from the debts and liabilities of its 
shareholders.186  
Moreover, the concept of the limited liability makes shareholders 
liable for the corporate debts only to the extent of their investment.187 It 
is remarkable the fact that the limit liability doctrine was created latter 
and is different from the separate entity principle.188 The concept was 
developed for political reasons as an incentive for investments through the 
insulation of shareholders from the risks of business.189 In that time, only 
individuals were able to be shareholders; subsequently, when 
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 shareholders expanded to include corporations, corporate law extended 
the same principles to corporate groups.190 Indeed, the liability insulation 
is the reason that many companies have chosen to expand their business 
through the formation of subsidiaries instead of branches.191  
 Nevertheless, the traditional concept of a corporate entity differs 
from the reality of modern corporations.192 While the public views each 
MNE as one firm, the law regards each MNE as several entities that 
comprise a corporate group.193 The dichotomy impedes the imposition of 
liability on MNEs because under the law each subsidiary entity is 
responsible for its own obligations,194 an advantage that has been abused 
by MNE through the creation of multiple entities within each corporate 
group.  
 However, the law has not been completely blind to this situation; to 
prevent manipulation by MNEs in an attempt to evade the liability, 
corporate law has started to treat the different entities of a corporate 
group as a single enterprise in areas such as taxation, labor, bribery, 
antitrust, etc.195 Nevertheless, the approaches adopted by different legal 
systems to adapt the law to the new realities have differed and are far 
from perfect. 
                                                 
190 Id. 
191 Antunes, supra note 1, at 219. 
192 Blumberg, supra note 186, at 303. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. at 304. 
195 See id. 311-16 (offering a more detailed description of those laws). 
39 
  a. Comparative Law 
 
 In most common and civil law countries, limited liability is the rule; 
only under exceptional circumstances will it be set aside to pierce the 
corporate veil.196 The doctrine has been applied with mixed results due to 
difficulties in determining the line between liability and non-liability, 
however, and this has led to complete unpredictability in the resolution of 
cases.197   
 As a revolutionary approach, the EU proposed the “economic unit 
theory” which imposes unlimited liability on the parent company for the 
actions of its subsidiary depending on the amount of corporate control.198 
EU courts treat the different entities as one enterprise if they are under 
the control and management of the same shareholders.199 The theory’s 
weakness resides in the rigidity of its approach, which exposes parent 
companies to the possibility of constant litigation and forecloses the 
chance of exoneration even in cases where the parent company clearly 
was not at fault.200
 Some legal systems have resolved these problems by adopting a 
dualist approach.201 For instance, the German system distinguishes 
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 between “contractual groups” and “factual groups.” In the first group, a 
contract recognizes the parent control, and the parent company will 
always be liable for the debts of its subsidiary.202 On the other hand, in 
the second group, the parent exercises de facto control and is held liable 
only when the corporate debts originated from situations where the parent 
has effectively exercised control.203 The problem is that the reality of the 
organizational structures of specific companies does not always converge 
with the legal models.204
  None of these approaches works without failure. Their common 
failure is to oversimplify a complex issue which requires a flexible legal 
system that analyzes each situation case-by-case.205
 
  b. The Doctrine of the Corporate Veil 
 
 MNEs “operating through a parent/subsidiary hierarchical 
infrastructure, can create corporate layers and a presence dispersed 
through numerous states,”206 which can facilitate the insulation of liability 
of a MNE because in most Western countries the corporate law sees as 
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 many entities as are found in an enterprise, and each entity is only liable 
for the conduct of its own officers and employees.207
 Nevertheless, courts have overridden this general rule under 
exceptional circumstances by piercing the corporate veil to make the 
parent company responsible for the acts of its subsidiaries.208 The 
rationale for this practice recognizes that “a corporation will be looked 
upon as a legal entity as a general rule . . . but, when the notion of legal 
entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or 
defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an association of 
persons.” 209  
Courts have pierced the corporate veil when they have found that the 
parent company owns and controls the subsidiary to the extent that the 
subsidiary is relegated to the status of a mere instrument or “alter ego” of 
the parent.210 Other reasons that have justified the exception are fraud, 
misrepresentation, undercapitalization, and lack of corporate forms.211 
However, courts have not always agreed that each reason alone is strong 
enough to pierce the corporate veil.212
There is general consensus that the main analysis should focus on the 
level of control exerted by the parent, that is, the extent to which the 
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 parent has had a direct intervention in the daily activity of its 
subsidiary.213 It is not enough that the parent owns the subsidiary or has 
an ability to control it because, in order to make the parent liable, the 
parent has to actually exercise control.214  
 The Indian Court reached this conclusion in the Bhopal Case when it 
decided to lift the corporate veil of Union Carbide Corporation (UCC).215 In 
1984 a leak of lethal gas from a pesticide factory in Bhopal caused injuries 
to more than 200,000 people and the death of 200 people. The pesticide 
factory belonged to Union Carbide India, Ltd., (UCI) a company 
incorporated in India with the following ownership: 50.9% by UCC, an 
American company; 22% by the Indian government; and 27.1% publicly 
held.216 The Indian court concluded that UCC had control over UCI 
because there was no doubt that (1) UCC held the majority of the share 
capital of UCI at all times and (2) UCC had the total voting power over 
UCI at all times, controlling not only the Board of Directors of UCI but also 
its management. Therefore, the court concluded it was permissible to 
pierce the corporate veil and make UCC responsible for the tort, especially 
considering that the assets of UCI were insufficient to meet the claims.217
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  Nevertheless, courts rarely pierce the corporate veil because the 
social benefits of the limited liability doctrine outweigh its costs.218 As 
previously mentioned, the main goal of the doctrine of limited liability is to 
reduce financial risks for shareholders in order to encourage more risk-
taking investments in the market. 219 Following this policy, courts have 
rejected the argument that it should pierce the corporate veil simply 
because the parent organized the subsidiary with the intent of limiting its 
own liability, stating that there is nothing illegal about using the corporate 
form to limit liability.220
 The frequent use of the limited liability doctrine to shield the liability 
of a MNE is reproachable because usually MNEs are wholly controlled by 
their parent companies.221 It is often between the top executives that the 
major decisions are taken to establish the policies and strategies, and to 
supervise and approve the subsidiaries’ operations abroad.222
 
2. Jurisdiction Issues 
 
 In the European Union, the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters establishes 
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 general principles of jurisdiction that focus on the domicile of the 
defendant, the place of incorporation of the corporation, or the location of 
the events at issue in the lawsuit.223 Under the Brussels Convention, aside 
from suit against the defendant in the forum of his domicile, the litigation 
can only take place in a forum if the event took place there.224 Although 
English courts used to ignore the domicile principle, dismissing under 
forum non conveniens grounds when the alternative court was in a 
country which was not a member of the European Union,225 a ruling of the 
European Court of Justice four years ago established that the domicile 
principle has to be applied “even if the plaintiff is domiciled in a non-
member country.”226
 In the United States, the basis for jurisdiction is more liberal and was 
established by two landmark cases.227 In International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington,228 the Supreme Court established that “minimum contacts” 
were enough to establish jurisdiction over an absent defendant; 
nevertheless, its exercise should comply with “traditional notions of fair 
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 play and substantial justice” in order to respect constitutional due 
process.229 Subsequently, in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. California,230 the 
court held that jurisdiction should be exercised in a  “reasonable” manner.  
The U.S. rules permit litigation in the United States against defendants 
who are transient, if they are served during their stay, and against foreign 
corporations that are doing business in the United States.231 Moreover, 
U.S. jurisdiction principles do “not require a finding of a connection 
between the events at issue and the U.S.”232 Nevertheless, U.S. courts will 
have to take into account, before accepting jurisdiction, the fact that it is 
very unlikely that most courts of the world would enforce judgments from 
United States against non-American defendants for events that happened 
abroad.233
Although the broad U.S. rules may offer extensive jurisdiction in 
comparison with most Western countries, some countries have 
jurisdictional principles that may seem too excessive even in comparison 
to the American view.234 For instance, in France, citizens can bring 
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 litigation against any defendants for any cause.  Some countries also allow 
lawsuits against a defendant whose property is located in the forum.235  
 Not only must courts have personal jurisdiction over the defendant 
to hear the case, they also must have subject matter jurisdiction. The 
plaintiff must assert “claims cognizable in the particular court system;”236 
in other words, the claims must “fall within recognized causes of 
action.”237  
In the human rights area, the U.S. Alien Tort Statute provides that 
“[d]istrict courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an 
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States.”238 The act provides a foreign plaintiff with a 
federal forum for torts that are violations of customary international law 
committed in anyplace around the world.239 Its importance resides in the 
fact that most violations of human rights are committed by the victims’ 
governments, sometimes in conjunction with MNEs, and therefore, foreign 
plaintiffs may find it impossible to bring actions at home.240  
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 An example of this type of suit is Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co.,241 in which Shell was accused of instigating the Nigerian government 
to torture and kill local leaders who opposed oil exploitation. Another case 
is Doe v. Unocal Corp.,242 in which Unocal was accused of aiding and 
abetting the de facto government of Burma in its human rights violations 
(forced relocation of villagers, confiscation of property, forced labor, and 
rape of women) during the construction of a pipeline.  
 The statute has been strictly construed permitting consideration only 
of violations of human rights that are universally condemned such as 
torture, murder, genocide, and slavery.243 It remains to be seen if in the 
future the scope of the statute will be extended to labor and 
environmental violations, which may be possible once the international 
community has reached consensus regarding standards in those areas. 
 
 3. The Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine 
 
The doctrine of forum non conveniens is another obstacle faced by 
foreign plaintiffs trying to litigate in common law countries that are home 
countries of the MNEs.244 The doctrine basically allows the court to refuse 
to hear the case, even when it has subject matter and personal 
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 jurisdiction, when there is another place more appropriate to litigate, such 
as in the country where the events occurred.245
 The doctrine developed in the United States to counter-balance the 
broad American standards that established personal jurisdiction.246 The 
doctrine arose as an exception to the requirement that a court must hear 
a case once jurisdiction has been established, when “the plaintiff's forum 
choice was so egregiously inappropriate as to appear motivated by a 
desire to vex and harass the defendant.”247
 However, the modern American doctrine leans towards a more 
discretionary facet established by two key cases at the federal level: Gulf 
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert248 and Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno.249  
 In the Gulf Oil case, the Supreme Court emphasized that the 
doctrine leaves much to the discretion of the court.250 It also created a 
balancing test, whereby a court takes into account private interests of the 
litigant as well as public interests of the court and community.251 Among 
the private interests, the court mentioned the cost of attendance of willing 
witnesses, availability of compulsatory processes to ensure cooperation by 
unwilling witnesses, access to sources of proof, and enforceability of the 
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 judgment.252 Among the public interests, the court included the 
administrative difficulties of overburdened courts and the interest of the 
country where the violation occurred to have the case heard at home.253 
The Gulf Oil case also established a presumption in favor of the plaintiff, 
declaring that the plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be disturbed 
unless the balance of interests is strongly in favor of the defendant.254
Years later, in the Piper Aircraft case, the Supreme Court reinforced 
what it already had said in the Gulf Oil case with respect to the discretion 
of the court, declaring that the court’s decision can only be reversed when 
there is a clear abuse of discretion,255 eliminating almost any chance to 
appeal a dismissal based on forum non conveniens grounds. Moreover, 
after this, “appellate courts have little power to create uniformity,”256 and 
since the balance of interest is left to the court’s discretion, there is great 
uncertainty concerning how a court is going to apply the doctrine in each 
particular case. 
While the Gulf Oil case involved only U.S. citizens, the Piper Aircraft 
case involved foreign plaintiffs,257 a reason why the court probably ruled 
that the presumption in favor of the plaintiff deserves less deference when 
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 the plaintiff is an alien. 258 The court also stated that the plaintiff will not 
defeat a forum non conveniens dismissal by merely showing that the law 
that would be applied in the foreign forum is less favorable to the 
plaintiff.259
 Probably the most important public interest is the interest of the 
foreign country in having its local controversies heard at home, which is 
known as “judicial comity.” It is basically an act of deference from the 
court to the foreign country.260 The court has to decide if “there is 
sufficient local interest in the foreign forum to justify having the case 
decided there.”261 From the court’s perspective, to retain jurisdiction in 
those cases would be seen as an act of imperialism whereby a sovereign 
imposed its own standards and rules on the country where the appropriate 
forum is located.262  However, it is ironic that the American court in the 
Bhopal case263 gave great weight to this interest, while the Indian 
government showed a clear interest in having the case heard in the United 
States.264 The American court hardly showed respect for India’s interest. 
 At the U.S. state level, the doctrine has not always been used in the 
same way as at the federal level, but in the last few years, there has been 
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 greater adherence to the federal approach.265 In Dow Chemical Co. v. 
Castro Alfaro,266 eighty-two Costa Rican plantation workers brought an 
action in Texas claiming that they had suffered personal injuries, including 
sterility and cancer, caused by their exposure to a pesticide manufactured 
by Dow Chemical Company and Shell Oil, both U.S.-based multinational 
companies. The pesticide had been banned in the United States more than 
a decade previously because of the dangerous consequences to human 
health. The Texas Supreme Court held that forum non conveniens would 
not be a bar to wrongful death and personal injury actions arising in a 
foreign state.267 Nevertheless, shortly after this case, the Texas legislature 
enacted a bill that overruled the case as a result of strong lobbying by the 
corporate sector.268
On the other hand, Australian courts have upheld the original goal of 
the forum non conveniens doctrine by dismissing only those cases that do 
not belong to its courts, and applying the doctrine only in exceptional 
circumstances.269 England270 and Ireland have adopted the same 
discretionary American approach, which places them in clear conflict with 
the principles set out in the Brussels Convention.271
                                                 
265 Id. at  54. 
266 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990).  
267 See id. at 675-79.
268 Reed, supra note 206, at 56-57. 
269 Id. at 57. 
270 See id. at 82-89 for further analysis of the development of the doctrine in English courts. 
271 Id. at 84-85. 
52 
 The doctrine is used to combat forum shopping exercised by some 
lawyers to take advantage of higher awards.272 However, the practice of 
dismissing cases to prevent forum shopping is questionable because the 
lawyers are only trying to do their job effectively by choosing the most 
favorable forum for their clients.273 Moreover, in certain circumstances 
under the special circumstances of the case the lawyers have no real 
choice of an alternative forum for their clients.274
Unfortunately, the Anglo-American doctrine is used by MNEs to 
escape liability for their conduct abroad, leaving some foreign plaintiffs 
with no other remedy, since substantial and procedural differences 
between forums, not to mention the corruption factor, can make the 
litigation possible only in the forum in which the litigation had been 
dismissed. In fact, only a very small percentage of cases are pursued in 
foreign forums once they have been dismissed.275  MNE lawyers spend 
much time and money on their arguments to have a case dismissed 
because they know that once the case is dismissed, the lawsuit is 
practically over.276
It is very controversial when this doctrine is invoked by MNEs against 
foreign plaintiffs since it seems that injuries done by corporations of the 
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 forum to foreign nationals abroad are not the forum’s problem.277 There is 
no doubt that courts exercise open discrimination against foreign 
plaintiffs.278 By dismissing such cases on the forum non conveniens 
ground, common law courts are closing their eyes to corporate 
malpractice, negligence, and harmful conduct. For instance, it should be of 
great concern that some MNEs sell to foreign poor countries products that 
have been prohibited in their home countries, using these developing 
countries as the “industrial world’s garbage can.”279 There are also claims 
that MNEs engage in systematic degradation of the environment, or do not 
act with reasonable care when they use production plants that emit levels 
of sulfur dioxide at many times above what is acceptable under their 
home country laws.280  Even worse are the accusations against MNEs that 
act in concert with governments that violate human rights.281 Such MNE 
conduct will continue because the MNE’s wrongdoings are not punished by 
their home countries or by the host countries, 282 allowing MNEs to benefit 
from the “best of both worlds.”283 These concerns have been clearly 
expressed by the Dow Chemical court:  
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 Some United States multinational corporations will 
undoubtedly continue to endanger human life and the 
environment with such activities until the economic 
consequences of these actions are such that it becomes 
unprofitable to operate in this manner. When a court dismisses 
a case against a United States multinational corporation, it 
often removes the most effective restraint on corporate 
misconduct ... In the absence of meaningful tort liability in the 
United States for their actions, some will continue to operate 
without adequate regard for the human and environmental 
costs of their actions. This result cannot be allowed ...284
  Although it is the responsibility of host countries to fashion 
regulations that include acceptable standards, and to provide courts that 
allow its citizens to legitimately sue MNEs, the race to the bottom in which 
they are engaged makes the responsibility an illusion.285 In their 
competition to attract investments,  “the government that offers the 
lowest potential tort and environmental liability wins.”286 MNEs avoid 
countries with rigorous regulations, and are able to shop for jurisdictions 
that lack standards or have low standards, where individuals have limited 
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 access to courts.287 This lack of a legal infrastructure translates into lower 
costs and bigger profits for MNEs. 
  To avoid the difficulties in overcoming the separate legal entities 
principle and the forum non conveniens dismissal, plaintiff’s lawyers have 
started to make allegations that focus on the actions of the parent itself, 
as the entity that set the policies and supervised the operations of its 
subsidiary.288 This strategy was used in the Aguinda case, in which it was 
alleged that the operational decisions that caused the injuries in Ecuador 
were made in Texaco’s headquarters in New York.289
In order to reduce the discretionary power of U.S. courts to dismiss 
cases under the forum non conveniens doctrine, governments in Latin 
America have enacted laws290 that eliminate the subject-matter 
jurisdiction of cases against American MNEs in Latin American courts.291 
With this strategy, they try to help their nationals to gain access to U.S. 
courts by making their local forum unavailable and thereby lessening the 
possibility of dismissal under forum non conveniens grounds in U.S. 
courts.292  
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
A. Developing Countries Should Jointly Raise Their Standards293 
 
 It is very tempting to dream of an international convention, whereby 
all of the countries of the world would adopt the same standards. 
Nevertheless, the experiences of the UN and WTO have demonstrated that 
it is impossible for rich and poor countries to reach consensus because of 
their different interests and circumstances. Therefore, a more realistic 
solution is a convention among developing countries; because they share 
the same interests, they may more quickly reach a consensus on 
minimum standards. 
 The advantages of the suggested solution become clearer if two other 
proposals are discharged: first, that MNEs should control the setting of 
minimum standards, and second, that home countries  
 The first proposal favoring standard-setting by MNEs is based on the 
argument that they have so much economic and political power that it is 
their moral duty to provoke the setting of minimum standards, influencing 
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 not only host countries but also others MNEs.294 Although few MNEs would 
admit that they are only interested in making profits, it would be 
unrealistic to believe that MNEs have to opt between adopting the best 
practice and taking advantage of lower standards.295
For instance, Lewis Strauss (Lewis) was the first company to adopt a 
corporate code that afterwards served as a model for other MNE corporate 
codes.296 In 1993, following the guidance of its corporate code, the 
company closed its plants in China in response to reports of human rights 
abuses in that country.297 No other company followed this action, and 
while they continued to benefit from the lower standards in China, Lewis 
lost a core market.298 Three years later, Lewis revised its code, deleting 
the provision that mandated the termination of business in countries in 
which there are human rights abuses.299 Shortly thereafter, Lewis 
reopened again its plants in China.300  
The experience of Lewis shows that even the willingness of a MNE to 
do the right thing is not enough.301 If they try to adopt higher standards, 
they are destined to fail competitively.302 While there still are countries 
with lower standards, there will always be a MNE that takes advantage of 
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 such standards. Therefore, an effective solution must come from host 
countries. 
Some scholars have suggested a second proposal, whereby home 
countries legislate extraterritorial regulations for their MNEs which would 
be applicable at home as well as abroad.303 The problem with this 
approach is that the regulation of higher standards by home countries will 
place their MNEs operating abroad at a competitive disadvantage with 
respect to other MNEs, which are not subject to those standards by their 
governments.304 In addition, extraterritorial legislation could be seen as an 
invasive practice of the home countries by host countries that deliberately 
choose low standards; host countries could even claim that home 
countries are not respecting their sovereign rights.305 After all, “the 
general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful 
or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where 
the act is done.”306
  Having demonstrated the weaknesses of these proposals, it is clear 
that the only effective and legitimate way to ensure an effective resolution 
of the lack of standards or low standards is for host countries to set 
minimum standards. The Treaty of Versailles of 1919 declared, “The 
failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle 
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 in the way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their 
own countries.”307 Although the treaty referred only to labor standards, 
the statement could also be extended to human rights and environmental 
standards. Individual states would not unilaterally adopt higher standards 
because they would lose investments in favor of those states that 
maintained low standards. However if all of the states agreed to raise 
standards, then it would be a win-win situation for every state since each 
state would compete to attract investment from an equal position thereby 
ensuring a level playing field.  
This argument further supported by the reality that if host countries 
do not protect their labor force, the human rights of their nationals, and 
their environment, why should anyone else do it? After all, an inherent 
duty of any state is the protection of its nationals. Moreover, the threat of 
MNE relocation, which is the main fear of poor countries, would be 
eliminated if all of the poor countries together adopt higher standards. 
Finally, poor countries again would hold the balance of power which is now 
in the powerful hands of MNEs. 
 In this context, it is essential that the same standards apply to MNEs 
as well as to domestic corporations; such practice would be in accordance 
                                                 
307 Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, 225 Consol. T.S. 188, pt. XIII pmbl., 112 B.F.S.P. 1, 
amended on several occasions and current revision reprinted in ILO, Constitution of the 
International Labour Organization and Standing Orders of the International Labour Conference 5-
24 (1980). 
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 with the notion of “national treatment” which imprints most trade and 
investment liberalization.308   
 
B. Emphasis on Enforcement Mechanisms 
 
 There are three types of enforcement mechanisms: internal self-
enforcement, vertical enforcement, and horizontal enforcement.309 
Internal self-enforcement, executed by the state itself, is the most 
important type of enforcement since violations generally occur within a 
state.310 Vertical enforcement is controlled by intergovernmental 
organizations that can influence a government to end violations.311 Lastly, 
horizontal enforcement is done by other states that can exert pressure 
against a violator.312  
 The proposed approach will center mainly on internal self-
enforcement, but since it is known that certain governments could not be 
trusted to comply with these standards, they need exterior pressures. 
Vertical and horizontal enforcement thus can help to ensure the 
governments’ compliance. 
 
                                                 
308 Ward, supra note 12, at 473; Pergar, supra note 130, at 3. 
  309 See HENRY J. STEINER, DETLEV F. VAGTS & HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 638- 39     
(4th ed. 1994). 
310 Id. at 638. 
311 Id. 
312 Id. at 639. 
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 1. Internal Self-Enforcement: The Monitoring and Enforcement of 
Corporate Codes Should Be Mainly in the Charge of National Authorities 
 
Regulations concerning a specific issue require both norm enunciation 
and an enforcement mechanism.313 Once developing countries have 
agreed to adopt minimum standards, and assuming that developed 
countries continue to maintain their higher standards, the countries should 
compile their standards in a national model code, which would serve as a 
guideline for voluntary corporate codes.  Therefore, corporations would be 
free to adopt their own codes as long as they incorporated the minimum 
standards. The proposed solution thereby would avoid any controversy 
about “binding” codes. Three decades of experience have shown that 
conflicts of interest make a “binding” legal instrument for MNEs an illusory 
goal, but if MNEs and national authorities focus on the effectiveness of the 
codes, “it may blur the distinction between a voluntary and a binding 
code.”314  Once corporations have adopted their codes, local authorities 
thus should assure compliance with the codes by providing incentives and 
by monitoring them MNE activity. 
Governments should reward corporations that comply with their 
codes with preferences for government contracts and financial assistance 
in their trade and exports. Governments also should reprove corporations 
                                                 
313 Stephens, supra note 155, at 402-03. 
314 Rubin, supra note 14, at 1286. 
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 that do not comply by the removal of financial assistance, as well as the 
threat of liability under national laws. This approach inspired two U.S. 
bills: the Good Corporate Citizenship and Federal Procurement Incentives 
Act of 1997 and the Corporate Code of Conduct Act of 2001.315  
   One way to monitor MNEs would be to require mandatory disclosure 
not only of MNE financial information but also of “the social, political, 
environmental and human rights implications of their actions.”316 Public 
reports will put the MNEs under great social pressure to comply with their 
codes and to act with great care, and will be welcomed by “consumers and 
the investment community  [who] will be able to effectively and equitably 
determine MNEs’ ethical standards that deserve their financial 
patronage.”317 Finally, it will enhance transparency and make easier the 
eradication of bribery at corporate levels. 
To ensure the enforcement of mandatory disclosure laws, the laws 
must provide sanctions for misleading disclosure and for non-disclosure, 
which can expose companies to greater liabilities and can act as another 
powerful motivation for a change in business practices.318
 
                                                 
315 See Westfield, supra note 9, at 1104-05, for a description of both bills. Although they did not 
pass successfully through the U.S. Congress, they both serve as models for this approach. Id. 
316 Cynthia Williams, Codes of Conduct and Transparency, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 415, 
415 (2001). The requirement of greater disclosure is the type of approach taken by many 
organizations, such as the OEDC in its Guidelines for MNE in an attempt to achieve more 
transparency. 
317 Westfield, supra note 9, at 1108. 
318 Williams, supra note 316, at 421. 
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 2. Vertical and Horizontal Enforcement: Support by the International 
Community 
  
  The support of the international community can ensure a higher 
degree of compliance by developing states and MNEs. On the ambit of 
vertical enforcement, one mechanism to exercise pressure for 
implementing minimum standards could be “conditional lending by 
international financial institutions.”319 This process could be effective if it is 
supported by institutions such as the World Bank or the International 
Monetary Fund, which could incorporate these human rights, labor, and 
environmental standards as one condition more in the their “Golden 
Straitjacket.” In particular, the IMF, which has substantial powers, even 
more than the WTO, could exercise pressure on developing countries to 
comply with its conditions.320 Nevertheless, only the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development is considering the inclusion of labor 
standards as a prerequisite for financial loans.321  
  International organizations also can introduce a system of 
information and research to measure the degree of compliance of 
governments and MNEs in particular. They could use the results to exert 
pressure on violators by taking the measures that are among their 
faculties. For instance, the IMF or the WB could deny financial help to 
                                                 
319 Charnovitz, supra note 30, at 150.   
320 VAGTS, DODGE &  KOH, supra note 6, at 181. 
321 Charnovitz, supra note 30, at 150. 
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 violators-governments, the WTO could impose a ban on the trade of 
products from violators-governments or violators-MNE, and the ILO, the 
UN and other non-governmental organizations could use bad publicity 
against MNE that do not comply with minimum standards. 
  Horizontal enforcement could include the requirement the 
governments of developed and developing countries consent to boycott 
products made by lower standards. The British Labour Party and Trades 
Union Congress already had proposed this approach at the World 
Economic Conference of 1927, recommending an international convention 
whereby all member would agree to boycott goods made under lower 
conditions than those promoted by the ILO Conventions.322   
  Moreover, the ILO should take a more aggressive role in its mission 
to promote labor standards, such as implementing the trade controls 
established by new conventions.323 It could demand that governments not 
trade in goods made in violation of their labor standards, a technique 
which is already used in the environmental area.324  It is important to 
realize that “[t] his measure is not an economic sanction against a target 
country, but rather a trade control on odious products.”325
 Another useful practice is the Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP), under “which industrial countries provide duty-free treatment to 
                                                 
322 VAGTS, DODGE &  KOH, supra note 6, at 188.  
323 Charnovitz, supra note 30, at 162. 
  324 Id. 
325 Id. at 163. 
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 certain products from developing countries.” 326 The United States and the 
European Union have put this system into practice, emphasizing labor 
conditions.327 Once the U.S. GSP was established, it gave preferences to 
the beneficiary countries for ten years.328 When in 1984 it extended the 
period for eight and a half years, it introduced a new category of countries 
which were excluded from GSP benefits “if such country has not taken or 
is not taking steps to afford internationally recognized worker rights to 
workers in the country.”329    
  The United States also used this kind of mechanism to influence 
foreign nation to adopt minimum labor standards in the Caribbean Basin 
Economic Recovery Act,330 which commands the President to consider if 
the workers in a country are afforded “reasonable workplace conditions 
and enjoy the right to organize and bargain collectively” when giving trade 
benefits to Caribbean countries.331 Minimum labor standards were also 
considered in the Overseas Private Investment Corporation Act,332 which 
                                                 
326 Id. at 151.  
327 Id. For instance, in 1996 the EU terminated GSP benefits for Burma due to its forced labor 
practices. 
328 Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. 2319. (1974). 
329 Gibney & Emerick, supra note 4, at 137 (citing The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, 19 U.S.C. 
2101). Section 503 of the Act clarified that "internationally recognized worker rights" included: (1) 
the right of association; (2) the right to organize and bargain collectively; (3) a prohibition on the 
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occupational safety and health.    
330 19 U.S.C. 2701-2706 (1984). 
331 Gibney & Emerick, supra note 4, at 137. 
332 22 U.S.C. 2191-2200 (1969). 
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 improves “U.S. development assistance programs by insuring and/or 
facilitating private initiatives.”333  
  
C. Modernization of Corporate Law 
 
 In order to achieve greater accountability of MNEs, it is necessary to 
revise the traditional concepts of corporate law worldwide. The relations 
among the different enterprises inside a MNE vary from MNE to MNE, and 
even in the same MNE, the relations may differ depending on the kind of 
decision to be made.334 It seems that the best way to determine whether 
a parent should be held liable for its subsidiaries is by establishing in each 
case whether the control of the parent was effectively exercised.335 This 
approach permits a flexible system; in addition, the burden of proof 
should be placed on the parent.336  
What seems pretty obvious is that the greater the parent is involved 
in the day-to-day control of the subsidiary, the greater its liability should 
be.337 A proposed flexible system should take into account many factors 
that ultimately will determine the kind and degree of liability of a MNE in 
                                                 
333 Gibney & Emerick, supra note 4, at 138. 
334 Antunes, supra note 1, at 228-29. 
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337 Ward, supra note 12, at 459. 
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 each concrete case.338 Some factors that have been proposed are the 
following: 
 
(i) The ties of the MNE with the host government. The more influence a 
corporation has in the government, the larger are its duties in the area of 
human rights -a duty of private actors and states not to be complicit to 
the violation of human rights.339
(ii) The control of the MNE over the population affected. The more control 
a corporation has over individuals, the more duties it has towards them.340 
The MNE will have higher duties if it has a direct impact upon the physical 
and mental health and well-being of the people.341
(iii) The influence of the MNE with respect to who is actually doing the 
violation -if is a subsidiary, a supplier, etc.342  
 All these considerations converge with what Phillip I. Blumberg had in 
mind when he stated, “[E]nterprise law is a product of the modern age, an 
age in which the law is increasingly concerned with multifactor factual 
analysis, rather than with transcendental legal constructs.”343
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 D. Host Countries Should Ensure an Impartial Forum to Its Nationals  
 
Host countries should take strong steps to strengthen their judicial 
systems to provide their citizens with adequate forums to pursue their 
legitimate claims.  To achieve that goal, changes have to be made in the 
following areas: 
 
  (i) In the structure of courts in order to offer impartial courts. 
(ii) In the civil and criminal legislation to provide effective causes of action 
for violations of minimum standards, ensuring the accountability of 
corporations and a just indemnification for victims. 
(iii) In the procedural legislation to facilitate litigation by the plaintiff, such 
as importing U.S. mechanisms such as contingent fees and class actions. 
 
These changes will require an important structural modification of 
most legal systems and governments will have to contribute substantial 
financial resources to effect the modification, but such action is necessary 
and worthwhile.   
One alternative method to ensure that citizens with have an adequate 
forum would be to import the dispute resolution clause between MNEs and 
host governments which is included in most bilateral investment 
agreements. In the clause, the MNE would agree to submit to the 
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 jurisdiction of an international court of justice or arbitration tribunal 
whenever nationals of the host country raise a claim to that court for 
violations of the minimum standards by the particular MNE. This clause 
could be included in each bilateral investment agreements. It would be an 
effective way to submit such claims to neutral courts, which have nothing 
to do with the MNE or the host country, and it would be specially useful 
for developing countries that have a weak judicial system. However, the 
cost of litigation can be higher under this approach, and governments 
should find a way to lessen the burden on plaintiffs by creating a fund, 
requiring MNEs to contribute liability insurance or other financial 
assistance. 
   
E. A Sensitive Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine 
 
  As was stated above, host countries should provide their nationals 
with an adequate forum to avoid forcing their nationals to litigate in other 
countries.344 Nevertheless, in those exceptional cases where the plaintiff is 
litigating abroad, home countries should offer impartial courts to the 
foreign plaintiff, who may be left without any other remedy, instead of 
automatically protecting their MNEs with controversial mechanisms such 
as the doctrine of forum non conveniens.  
                                                 
344 Ward, supra note 12, at 468. 
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  The model to be followed by common law courts should be the action 
taken by some American judges, who have departed from the Piper 
Aircraft standard, showing sensitivity to the particular circumstances of 
the foreign plaintiff.345 These courts considered whether in the particular 
case justice could be done by the alternative forum. For instance, some 
courts considered if the lack of class actions in the foreign forum would 
impede the litigation, and if the corruption of the foreign government 
would impede an adequate resolution of the case to the extent to make 
the foreign forum inadequate.346  In addition, many courts dismissed the 
case under the forum non conveniens ground subject to certain conditions 
such as the submission of the MNE to the jurisdiction of the foreign 
court.347
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
345 Dorward, supra note 171, at 162. 
346 See Carella, supra note 240, at 723-728, for an extended analysis of these considerations by 
many courts. 
347 In the Bhopal case, the U.S. court subjected the dismissal to the condition that Union Carbide 
Corporation submit to the jurisdiction of the Indian Court. The same approach was taken by the 
Court of Appeals in the Aguinda case, where the case was remanded to the District Court, which 
was obligated to reopen it and to at least subject the dismissal to the submission of jurisdiction of 
Texaco to Ecuadorian courts. After considering the results of the report of the Department of State 
about the high level of corruption and the political instability of Ecuador, the District Court also 
asked the Ecuador governments for additional submissions on whether the foreign courts would be 
able to hear the case with independence and impartiality if the case were heard there. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
Society demands greater corporate accountability. MNEs have to 
learn that they cannot act with impunity because if they engage in abusive 
practices or violate environmental standards, they will have to confront 
negative publicity and liability; in the end, it is in their own interest to be 
careful. 
 The solution to the problem of MNE responsibility should be an 
internationally coordinated approach, where the main responsibility must 
be on host countries to agree to raise their low standards and to enact 
legislation that will effectively enforce the new standards. In addition, the 
support and pressure exerted by international organizations and 
developed countries will be necessary to ensure that all developing 
countries are doing their best to comply with their commitments, and that 
MNEs are complying with local laws. 
 Furthermore, traditional concepts of corporate law need to be 
modernized worldwide to avoid the impunity of MNEs that hide under the 
corporate veil.  This thesis proposed a flexible system that will analyze the 
different factors of each case to satisfactorily determine corporate 
responsibility. 
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  Moreover, impartial courts should be available to potential plaintiffs 
to ensure that justice will be done, as well as to encourage MNEs to 
engage in positive changes in business behavior. Host countries should 
strengthen their procedural and substantive laws to effectively deal with 
this type of litigation and to provide its nationals with an adequate forum, 
either national or international. Home countries additionally should open 
the doors of their courts to foreign plaintiffs that are left with no remedy. 
 If these recommendations are implemented, then the values of our 
global society will put the well-being of individuals over economic 
interests. In the words of Halina Ward,  “Encouraging global corporate 
responsibility then becomes part of efforts to put a human face on the 
global economy.” 348
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